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A MODEL FOR A LARGE INVESTOR TRADING AT MARKET
INDIFFERENCE PRICES. II: CONTINUOUS-TIME CASE
By Peter Bank1 and Dmitry Kramkov2
Technische Universita¨t Berlin and Carnegie Mellon University
We develop from basic economic principles a continuous-time
model for a large investor who trades with a finite number of market
makers at their utility indifference prices. In this model, the mar-
ket makers compete with their quotes for the investor’s orders and
trade among themselves to attain Pareto optimal allocations. We first
consider the case of simple strategies and then, in analogy to the con-
struction of stochastic integrals, investigate the transition to general
continuous dynamics. As a result, we show that the model’s evolution
can be described by a nonlinear stochastic differential equation for
the market makers’ expected utilities.
1. Introduction. A typical financial model presumes that the prices of
traded securities are not affected by an investor’s buy and sell orders. From
a practical viewpoint, this assumption is justified as long as his trading
volume remains small enough to be easily covered by market liquidity. An
opposite situation occurs, for instance, when an economic agent has to sell a
large block of shares over a short period of time; see, for example, Almgren
and Chriss [1] and Schied and Scho¨neborn [24]. This and other examples
motivate the development of financial models for a “large” trader, where
the dependence of market prices on his strategy, called a price impact or a
demand pressure, is taken into account.
Hereafter, we assume that the interest rate is zero and, in particular, is
not affected by the large investor. As usual in mathematical finance, we
describe a (self-financing) strategy by a predictable process Q= (Qt)0≤t≤T
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where Qt is the number of stocks held just before time t and T is a finite
time horizon. The role of a “model” is to define a predictable process X(Q)
representing the evolution of the cash balance for the strategy Q. We denote
by S(Q) the marginal price process of traded stocks, that is, St(Q) is the
price at which one can trade an infinitesimal quantity of stocks at time t.
Recall that in the standard model of a “small” agent the price S does not
depend on Q and
Xt(Q) =
∫ t
0
Qu dSu −QtSt.
In mathematical finance, a common approach is to specify the price im-
pact of trades exogenously, that is, to postulate it as one of the inputs. For
example, Frey and Stremme [13], Platen and Schweizer [23], Papanicolaou
and Sircar [22] and Bank and Baum [4] choose a stochastic field of reaction
functions, which explicitly state the dependence of the marginal prices on
the investor’s current holdings, C¸etin, Jarrow and Protter in [8] start with a
stochastic field of supply curves, which define the prices in terms of traded
quantities (changes in holdings), and Cvitanic´ and Ma [10] make the drift
and the volatility of the price process dependent on a trading strategy; we
refer the reader to the recent survey [17] by Go¨kay, Roch and Soner for more
details and additional references. Note that in all these models the processes
X(Q) and S(Q), of the cash balance and of the marginal stock price, only
depend on the “past” of the strategy Q, in the sense that
Xt(Q) =Xt(Q
t), St(Q) = St(Q
t),(1.1)
where Qt , (Qs∧t)0≤s≤T denotes the process Q “stopped” at t with s ∧ t,
min(s, t).
The exogenous nature of the above models facilitates their calibration to
market data; see, for example, [9] by C¸etin, Jarrow and Protter. There are,
however, some disadvantages. For example, the models in [4, 8, 13, 22, 23]
and [9] do not satisfy the natural “closability” property for a large investor
model:
|Qn| ≤
1
n
=⇒ XT (Q
n)→ 0, n→∞,(1.2)
while in Cvitanic´ and Ma [10] the stock price is not affected by a jump in
investor’s holdings: St(Qt +∆Qt) = St(Qt).
In our project, we seek to derive the dependence of prices on strategies
endogenously by relying on the framework developed in financial economics.
A starting point here is the postulate that, at any given moment, a price
reflects a balance between demand and supply or, more formally, it is an
output of an equilibrium. In addition to the references cited below, we re-
fer the reader to the book [21] by O’Hara and the survey [2] by Amihud,
Mendelson and Pedersen.
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To be more specific, denote by ψ the terminal price of the traded security,
which we assume to be given exogenously, that is, ST (Q) = ψ for every
strategy Q. Recall that in a small agent model the absence of arbitrage
implies the existence of an equivalent probability measure Q such that
St = EQ[ψ|Ft], 0≤ t≤ T,(1.3)
where Ft is the σ-field describing the information available at time t. This
result is often called the fundamental theorem of asset pricing ; in full gen-
erality, it has been proved by Delbaen and Schachermayer in [11, 12]. The
economic nature of this pricing measure Q does not matter in the standard,
small agent, setup. However, it becomes important in an equilibrium-based
construction of models for a large trader where it typically originates from
a Pareto optimal allocation of wealth and is given by the expression (1.4)
below.
We shall consider an economy formed by M market participants, called
hereafter the market makers, whose preferences for terminal wealth are de-
fined by utility functions um = um(x),m= 1, . . . ,M , and an identical subjec-
tive probability measure P. It is well known in financial economics that the
Pareto optimality of the market makers’ wealth allocation α= (αm)m=1,...,M
yields the pricing measure Q defined by
dQ
dP
= vmu′m(α
m), m= 1, . . . ,M,(1.4)
where vm > 0 is a normalizing constant.
It is natural to expect that in the case when the strategy Q is not anymore
negligible an expression similar to (1.3) should still hold true for themarginal
price process:
St(Q) = EQt(Q)[ψ|Ft(Q)], 0≤ t≤ T.(1.5)
This indicates that the price impact at time t described by the mapping Q 7→
St(Q) may be attributed to two common aspects of market’s microstructure:
1. Information: Q 7→ Ft(Q). Models focusing on information aspects nat-
urally occur in the presence of an insider, where Ft(Q), the information
available to the market makers at time t, is usually generated by the sum of
Q and the cumulative demand process of “noise” traders; see Glosten and
Milgrom [16], Kyle [20] and Back and Baruch [3], among others.
2. Inventory : Q 7→ Qt(Q). In view of (1.4), this reflects how αt(Q), the
Pareto optimal allocation of the total wealth or “inventory” induced by
Q, affects the valuation of marginal trades. Note that the random variable
αt(Q) is measurable with respect to the terminal σ-field FT (Q) [not with
respect to the current σ-field Ft(Q)!].
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In our study, we shall focus on the inventory aspect of price formation and
disregard the informational component. We assume that the market makers
share the same exogenously given filtration (Ft)0≤t≤T as the large trader
and, in particular, their information flow is not affected by his strategy Q:
Ft(Q) =Ft, 0≤ t≤ T.
Note that this informational symmetry is postulated only regarding the ex-
ternally given random outcome. As we shall discuss below, in inventory based
models, the actual form of the map Q 7→Qt(Q), or, equivalently, Q 7→ αt(Q)
is implied by game-theoretical features of the interaction between the mar-
ket makers and the investor. In particular, it depends on the knowledge the
market makers possess at time t about the subsequent evolution (Qs)t≤s≤T
of the investor’s strategy, conditionally on the forthcoming random outcome
on [t, T ].
For example, the models in Grossman and Miller [18], Garleanu, Pedersen
and Poteshman [14] and German [15] rely on a setup inspired by the Arrow–
Debreu equilibrium. Their framework implicitly assumes that right from the
start the market makers have full knowledge of the investor’s future strategy
Q (of course, contingent on the unfolding random scenario). In this case, the
resulting pricing measures and the Pareto allocations do not depend on time:
Qt(Q) =Q(Q), αt(Q) = α(Q), 0≤ t≤ T,(1.6)
and are determined by the budget equations:
EQ(Q)[α
m(0)] = EQ(Q)[α
m(Q)], m= 1, . . . ,M,
and the clearing condition:
M∑
m=1
αm(Q) =
M∑
m=1
αm(0) +
∫ T
0
Qt dSt(Q).
Here, Q(Q) and S(Q) are defined in terms of α(Q) by (1.4) and (1.5). The
positive sign in the clearing condition is due to our convention to interpret
Q as the number of stocks held by the market makers. It is instructive to
note that in the case of exponential utilities, when um(x) = − exp(−amx)
with a risk-aversion am > 0, the stock price in these models depends only
on the “future” of the strategy:
St(Q) = St((Qs)t≤s≤T ), 0≤ t≤ T,
which is just the opposite of (1.1).
In our model, the interaction between the market makers and the investor
takes place according to a Bertrand competition; a similar framework (but
with a single market maker and only in a one-period setting) was used in
Stoll [25]. The key economic assumptions can be summarized as follows:
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1. After every trade, the market makers can redistribute new income to
form a Pareto allocation.
2. As a result of a trade, the expected utilities of the market makers do
not change.
The first condition assumes that the market makers are able to find the most
effective way to share among themselves the risk of the resulting total endow-
ment, thus producing a Pareto optimal allocation. The second assumption
is a consequence of a Bertrand competition which forces the market makers
to quote the most aggressive prices without lowering their expected utilities;
in the limit, these utilities are left unchanged.
Our framework implicitly assumes that at every time t the market makers
have no a priori knowledge about the subsequent trading strategy (Qs)t≤s≤T
of the economic agent (even conditionally on the future random outcome).
As a consequence, the marginal price process S(Q) and the cash balance
process X(Q) are related to Q as in (1.1). Similarly, the dependence on Q of
the pricing measures and of the Pareto optimal allocations is nonanticipative
in the sense that
Qt(Q) =Qt(Q
t), αt(Q) = αt(Q
t), 0≤ t≤ T,
which is quite opposite to (1.6).
In [5], we studied the model in a static, one-step, setting. The current
paper deals with the general continuous-time framework. Building on the
single-period case in an inductive manner, we first define simple strategies,
where the trades occur only at a finite number of times; see Theorem 2.7.
The main challenge is then to show that this construction allows for a con-
sistent passage to general predictable strategies. For instance, it is an issue
to verify that the cash balance process X(Q) is stable with respect to uni-
form perturbations of the strategy Q and, in particular, that the closability
property (1.2) and its generalizations stated in Questions 2.9 and 2.10 hold.
These stability questions are addressed by deriving and analyzing a non-
linear stochastic differential equation for the market makers’ expected util-
ities; see (4.20) in Theorem 4.9. A key role is played by the fact, that to-
gether with the strategy Q, these utilities form a “sufficient statistics” in
the model, that is, they uniquely determine the Pareto optimal allocation
of wealth among the market makers. The corresponding functional depen-
dencies are explicitly given as gradients of the stochastic field of aggregate
utilities and its saddle conjugate; here we rely on our companion paper [6].
An outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we define the model
and study the case when the investor trades according to a simple strategy.
In Section 3, we provide a conditional version of the well-known param-
eterization of Pareto optimal allocations and recall basic results from [6]
concerning the stochastic field of aggregate utilities and its conjugate. With
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these tools at hand, we formally define the strategies with general continu-
ous dynamics in Section 4. We conclude with Section 5 by showing that the
construction of strategies in Section 4 is consistent with the original idea
based on the approximation by simple strategies. In the last two sections,
we restrict ourselves to a Brownian setting, due to convenience of references
to Kunita [19].
2. Model.
2.1. Market makers and the large investor. We consider a financial model
where M ∈ {1,2, . . .} market makers quote prices for a finite number of
stocks. Uncertainty and the flow of information are modeled by a filtered
probability space (Ω,F , (Ft)0≤t≤T ,P) satisfying the standard conditions of
right-continuity and completeness; the initial σ-field F0 is trivial, T is a
finite maturity and F =FT .
As usual, we identify random variables differing on a set of P-measure zero;
L
0(Rd) stands for the metric space of such equivalence classes with values
in Rd endowed with the topology of convergence in probability; Lp(Rd),
p ≥ 1, denotes the Banach space of p-integrable random variables. For a
σ-field A⊂ F and a set A⊂Rd denote L0(A,A) and Lp(A,A), p≥ 1, the
respective subsets of L0(Rd) and Lp(Rd) consisting of all A-measurable
random variables with values in A.
The way the market makers serve the incoming orders crucially depends
on their attitude toward risk, which we model in the classical framework of
expected utility. Thus, we interpret the probability measure P as a descrip-
tion of the common beliefs of our market makers (same for all) and denote
by um = (um(x))x∈R market maker m’s utility function for terminal wealth.
Assumption 2.1. Each um = um(x),m= 1, . . . ,M , is a strictly concave,
strictly increasing, continuously differentiable, and bounded from above func-
tion on the real line R satisfying
lim
x→∞
um(x) = 0.(2.1)
The normalizing condition (2.1) is added only for notational convenience.
Our main results will be derived under the following additional condition on
the utility functions, which, in particular, implies their boundedness from
above.
Assumption 2.2. Each utility function um = um(x), m = 1, . . . ,M , is
twice continuously differentiable and its absolute risk aversion coefficient is
bounded away from zero and infinity, that is, for some c > 0,
1
c
≤ am(x),−
u′′m(x)
u′m(x)
≤ c, x ∈R.
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The prices quoted by the market makers are also influenced by their initial
endowments α0 = (α
m
0 )m=1,...,M ∈ L
0(RM ), where αm0 is an F -measurable
random variable describing the terminal wealth of the mth market maker (if
the large investor, introduced later, will not trade at all). We assume that
the initial allocation α0 is Pareto optimal in the sense of:
Definition 2.3. Let G be a σ-field contained in F . A vector of F -
measurable random variables α = (αm)m=1,...,M is called a Pareto optimal
allocation given the information G or just a G-Pareto allocation if
E[|um(α
m)||G]<∞, m= 1, . . . ,M,(2.2)
and there is no other allocation β ∈L0(RM ) with the same total endowment,
M∑
m=1
βm =
M∑
m=1
αm,(2.3)
leaving all market makers not worse and at least one of them better off in
the sense that
E[um(β
m)|G]≥ E[um(α
m)|G] for all m= 1, . . . ,M(2.4)
and
P[E[um(β
m)|G]> E[um(α
m)|G]]> 0 for some m ∈ {1, . . . ,M}.(2.5)
A Pareto optimal allocation given the trivial σ-field F0 is simply called a
Pareto allocation.
In other words, Pareto optimality is a stability requirement for an allo-
cation of wealth which ensures that there are no mutually beneficial trades
that can be struck between market makers.
Finally, we consider an economic agent or investor who is going to trade
dynamically in the financial market formed by a bank account and J stocks.
We assume that the interest rate on the bank account is given exogenously
and is not affected by the investor’s trades; for simplicity of notation, we set
it to be zero. The stocks pay terminal dividends ψ = (ψj)j=1,...,J ∈ L
0(RJ ).
Their prices are computed endogenously and depend on investor’s order flow.
As the result of trading with the investor, up to and including time t ∈
[0, T ], the total endowment of the market makers may change from Σ0 ,∑M
m=1 α
m
0 to
Σ(ξ, θ),Σ0 + ξ + 〈θ,ψ〉=Σ0 + ξ +
J∑
j=1
θjψj ,(2.6)
where ξ ∈ L0(Ft,R) and θ ∈ L
0(Ft,R
J) are, respectively, the cash amount
and the number of assets acquired by the market makers from the investor;
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they are Ft-measurable random variables with values in R and R
J , respec-
tively. Our model will assume that Σ(ξ, θ) is allocated among the market
makers in the form of an Ft-Pareto allocation. For this to be possible, we
have to impose:
Assumption 2.4. For every x ∈R and q ∈RJ , there is an allocation
β ∈ L0(RM ) with total random endowment Σ(x, q) defined in (2.6) such that
E[um(β
m)]>−∞, m= 1, . . . ,M.(2.7)
See (3.15) for an equivalent reformulation of this assumption in terms of
the aggregate utility function. For later use, we verify its conditional version.
Lemma 2.5. Under Assumptions 2.1 and 2.4, for every σ-field G ⊂ F
and random variables ξ ∈L0(G,R) and θ ∈L0(G,RJ ) there is an allocation
β ∈ L0(RM ) with total endowment Σ(ξ, θ) such that
E[um(β
m)|G]>−∞, m= 1, . . . ,M.(2.8)
Proof. Clearly, it is sufficient to verify (2.8) on each of the G-measurable
sets
An , {ω ∈Ω: |ξ(ω)|+ |θ(ω)| ≤ n}, n≥ 1,
which shows that without loss of generality we can assume ξ and θ to be
bounded when proving (2.8). Then (ξ, θ) can be written as a convex combina-
tion of finitely many points (xk, qk) ∈R
1+J , k = 1, . . . ,K with G-measurable
weights λk ≥ 0,
∑K
k=1λ
k = 1. By Assumption 2.4, for each k = 1, . . . ,K there
is an allocation βk with the total endowment Σ(xk, qk) such that
E[um(β
m
k )]>−∞, m= 1, . . . ,M.
Thus, the allocation
β ,
K∑
k=1
λkβk
has the total endowment Σ(ξ, θ) and, by the concavity of the utility func-
tions, satisfies (2.7), and hence, also (2.8). 
2.2. Simple strategies. An investment strategy of the agent is described
by a predictable J -dimensional process Q = (Qt)0≤t≤T , where Qt =
(Qjt )j=1,...,J is the cumulative number of the stocks sold by the investor
through his transactions up to time t. For a strategy to be self-financing
we have to complement Q by a corresponding predictable process X =
(Xt)0≤t≤T describing the cumulative amount of cash spent by the investor.
Hereafter, we shall call such an X a cash balance process.
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Remark 2.6. Our description of a trading strategy follows the standard
practice of mathematical finance except for the sign: positive values of Q or
X now mean short positions for the investor in stocks or cash, and hence
total long positions for the market makers. This convention makes future
notation more simple and intuitive.
To facilitate the understanding of the economic assumptions behind our
model, we consider first the case of a simple strategy Q where trading occurs
only at a finite number of times, that is,
Qt =
N∑
n=1
θn1(τn−1,τn](t), 0≤ t≤ T,(2.9)
with stopping times 0 = τ0 ≤ · · · ≤ τN = T and random variables θn ∈
L
0(Fτn−1 ,R
J), n= 1, . . . ,N . It is natural to expect that, for such a strategy
Q, the cash balance process X has a similar form:
Xt =
N∑
n=1
ξn1(τn−1,τn](t), 0≤ t≤ T,(2.10)
with ξn ∈ L
0(Fτn−1 ,R), n= 1, . . . ,N . In our model, these cash amounts will
be determined by (forward) induction along with a sequence of conditionally
Pareto optimal allocations (αn)n=1,...,N such that each αn is an Fτn−1 -Pareto
allocation with the total endowment
Σ(ξn, θn) = Σ0 + ξn + 〈θn, ψ〉.
Recall that at time 0, before any trade with the investor has taken place,
the market makers have the initial Pareto allocation α0 and the total en-
dowment Σ0. After the first transaction of θ1 stocks and ξ1 in cash, the
total random endowment becomes Σ(ξ1, θ1). The central assumptions of our
model, which will allow us to identify the cash amount ξ1 uniquely, are that,
as a result of the trade:
1. The random endowment Σ(ξ1, θ1) is redistributed between the market
makers to form a new Pareto allocation α1.
2. The market makers’ expected utilities do not change:
E[um(α
m
1 )] = E[um(α
m
0 )], m= 1, . . . ,M.
Proceeding by induction, we arrive at the re-balance time τn with the
economy characterized by an Fτn−1 -Pareto allocation αn of the random en-
dowment Σ(ξn, θn). We assume that after exchanging θn+1 − θn securities
and ξn+1 − ξn in cash the market makers will hold an Fτn -Pareto alloca-
tion αn+1 of Σ(ξn+1, θn+1) satisfying the key condition of the preservation
of expected utilities:
E[um(α
m
n+1)|Fτn ] = E[um(α
m
n )|Fτn ], m= 1, . . . ,M.(2.11)
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The fact that this inductive procedure indeed works is ensured by the
following result, established in a single-period framework in [5], Theorem 2.6.
Theorem 2.7. Under Assumptions 2.1 and 2.4, every sequence of stock
positions (θn)n=1,...,N as in (2.9) yields a unique sequence of cash balances
(ξn)n=1,...,N as in (2.10) and a unique sequence of allocations (αn)n=1,...,N
such that, for each n= 1, . . . ,N , αn is an Fτn−1-Pareto allocation of Σ(ξn, θn)
preserving the market makers’ expected utilities in the sense of (2.11).
Proof. The proof follows from Lemma 2.5 above, Lemma 2.8 below
and a standard induction argument. 
Lemma 2.8. Let Assumption 2.1 hold and consider a σ-field G ⊂ F and
random variables γ ∈ L0(G, (−∞,0)M ) and Σ ∈ L0(R). Suppose there is an
allocation β ∈ L0(RM ) which has the total endowment Σ and satisfies the
integrability condition (2.8).
Then there are a unique ξ ∈ L0(G,R) and a unique G-Pareto allocation α
with the total endowment Σ+ ξ such that
E[um(α
m)|G] = γm, m= 1, . . . ,M.
Proof. The uniqueness of such ξ and α is a consequence of the defini-
tion of the G-Pareto optimality and the strict concavity and monotonicity of
the utility functions. Indeed, let ξ˜ and α˜ be another such pair. The allocation
βm ,
(
α˜m +
ξ − ξ˜
M
)
1
{ξ˜<ξ}
+ αm1
{ξ˜≥ξ}
, m= 1, . . . ,M,
has the same total endowment Σ+ ξ as α. If the G-measurable set {ξ˜ < ξ} is
not empty, then because the utility functions (um) are strictly increasing, β
dominates α in the sense of Definition 2.3 and we get a contradiction with
the G-Pareto optimality of α. Hence, ξ˜ ≥ ξ and then, by symmetry, ξ˜ = ξ. In
this case, the allocation β˜ , (α+ α˜)/2 has the same total endowment as α
and α˜. If α˜ 6= α then, in view of the strict concavity of the utility functions,
β˜ dominates both α and α˜, contradicting their G-Pareto optimality.
To verify the existence, we shall use a conditional version of the argument
from the proof of Theorem 2.6 in [5]. To facilitate references, we assume here-
after that |γ| ,
√∑M
m=1(γ
m)2 is integrable, that is, γ ∈ L1(G, (−∞,0)M ).
This extra condition does not restrict any generality as, if necessary, we can
replace the reference probability measure P with the equivalent measure Q
such that
dQ
dP
= const
1
1 + |γ|
.
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Note that because γ is G-measurable this change of measure does not affect
G-Pareto optimality.
For η ∈ L0(G,R), denote by B(η) the family of allocations β ∈ L0(RM )
with total endowments less than or equal to Σ+ η such that
E[um(β
m)|G]≥ γm, m= 1, . . . ,M.
Since the utility functions um = um(x) are increasing and converge to 0 as
x→∞ and because there is an allocation β of Σ satisfying (2.8), the set
H, {η ∈L0(G,R) :B(η) 6=∅}
is nonempty. For instance, it contains the random variable
η˜ ,M
∞∑
n=1
n(1An − 1An−1),
where, for n= 0,1, . . . ,
An , {ω ∈Ω:E[um(β
m + n)|G](ω)≥ γm(ω),m= 1, . . . ,M}.
Indeed, by construction, η˜ is G-measurable and, as An ↑Ω,
E[um(β
m + η˜/M)|G]≥ γm, m= 1, . . . ,M.
Hence, the allocation (βm + η˜/M)m=1,...,M belongs to B(η˜).
If η ∈ H, then the set B(η) ∈ L0(RM ) is convex (even with respect to
G-measurable weights) by the concavity of the utility functions. Moreover,
this set is bounded in L0(RM ):
lim
z→∞
sup
β∈B(η)
P[|β| ≥ z] = 0.
Indeed, from the properties of utility functions in Assumption 2.1 we deduce
that
x− ,max(0,−x)≤−
um(x)
u′m(0)
, x ∈R.
Hence, for β ∈ B(η),
E[(βm)−]≤
1
u′m(0)
E[−um(β
m)]≤
1
u′m(0)
E[−γm]<∞,
implying that the set {((βm)−)m=1,...,M :β ∈ B(η)} is bounded in L
1(RM ).
The boundedness of B(η) in L0(RM ) then follows after we recall that
M∑
m=1
βm ≤Σ+ η, β ∈ B(η).
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Observe that if the random variables (ηi)i=1,2 belong to H, then so does
their minimum η1∧η2. It follows that there is a decreasing sequence (ηn)n≥1
in H such that its limit ξ is less than or equal to every element of H. Let
βn ∈ B(ηn), n ≥ 1. As βn ∈ B(η1), the family of all possible convex combi-
nations of (βn)n≥1 is bounded in L
0(RM ). By Lemma A1.1 in Delbaen and
Schachermayer [11], we can then choose convex combinations ζn of (βk)k≥n,
n≥ 1, converging almost surely to a random variable α ∈ L0(RM ). It is clear
that
M∑
m=1
αm ≤Σ+ ξ.(2.12)
Since the utility functions are bounded above and, by the convexity of B(ηn),
ζn ∈ B(ηn), an application of Fatou’s lemma yields
E[um(α
m)|G]≥ lim sup
n→∞
E[um(ζ
m
n )|G]≥ γ
m, m= 1, . . . ,M.(2.13)
It follows that α ∈ B(ξ). The minimality property of ξ then immediately
implies that in (2.12) and (2.13) we have, in fact, equalities and that α is a
G-Pareto allocation. 
In Section 4, we shall prove a more constructive version of Theorem 2.7,
namely, Theorem 4.1, where the cash balances ξn and the Pareto allocations
αn will be given as explicit functions of their predecessors and of the new
position θn.
The main goal of this paper is to extend the definition of the cash balance
processes X from simple to general predictable strategies Q. This task has
a number of similarities with the construction of a stochastic integral with
respect to a semi-martingale. In particular, we are interested in the following
questions.
Question 2.9. For simple strategies (Qn)n≥1 that converge to another
simple strategy Q in ucp, that is, such that
(Qn −Q)∗T , sup
0≤t≤T
|Qnt −Qt| → 0,(2.14)
do the corresponding cash balance processes converge in ucp as well:
(Xn −X)∗T → 0?
Question 2.10. For every sequence of simple strategies (Qn)n≥1 con-
verging in ucp to a predictable process Q, does the sequence (Xn)n≥1 of
their cash balance processes converge to a predictable process X in ucp?
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Naturally, when we have an affirmative answer to Question 2.10, the pro-
cess X should be called the cash balance process for the strategy Q. Note
that a predictable process Q can be approximated by simple processes as in
(2.14) if and only if it has LCRL (left-continuous with right limits) trajec-
tories.
The construction of cash balance processes X and processes of Pareto
allocations for general strategies Q will be accomplished in Section 4, while
the answers to Questions 2.9 and 2.10 will be given in Section 5. These
results rely on the parameterization of Pareto allocations in Section 3.1 and
the properties of sample paths of the stochastic field of aggregate utilities
established in [6] and recalled in Section 3.2.
3. Random fields associated with Pareto allocations. Let us collect in
this section some notation and results which will allow us to work efficiently
with conditional Pareto allocations. We first recall some terminology. For a
set A⊂Rd a map ξ :A→ L0(Rn) is called a random field ; ξ is continuous,
convex, etc., if its sample paths ξ(ω) :A→Rn are continuous, convex, etc.,
for all ω ∈ Ω. A random field X :A × [0, T ]→ L0(Rn) is called a stochas-
tic field if, for t ∈ [0, T ], Xt ,X(·, t) :A→ L
0(Ft,R
n), that is, the random
variable Xt is Ft-measurable.
3.1. Parameterization of Pareto allocations. We begin by recalling the
results and notation from [5] concerning the classical parameterization of
Pareto allocations. As usual in the theory of such allocations, a key role is
played by the aggregate utility function
r(v,x), sup
x1+···+xM=x
M∑
m=1
vmum(x
m), v ∈ (0,∞)M , x∈R.(3.1)
We shall rely on the properties of this function stated in Section 3 of [6]. In
particular, r is continuously differentiable and the upper bound in (3.1) is
attained at the unique vector x̂= x̂(v,x) in RM determined by either
vmu′m(x̂
m) =
∂r
∂x
(v,x), m= 1, . . . ,M,(3.2)
or, equivalently,
um(x̂
m) =
∂r
∂vm
(v,x), m= 1, . . . ,M.(3.3)
Following [5], we denote by
A, (0,∞)M ×R×RJ ,(3.4)
the parameter set of Pareto allocations in our economy. An element a ∈A
will often be represented as a= (v,x, q). Here, v ∈ (0,∞)M is a Pareto weight
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and x ∈R and q ∈RJ stand for, respectively, a cash amount and a number
of stocks owned collectively by the market makers.
According to Lemma 3.2 in [5], for a = (v,x, q) ∈A, the random vector
pi(a) ∈ L0(RM ) defined by
vmu′m(pi
m(a)) =
∂r
∂x
(v,Σ(x, q)), m= 1, . . . ,M,(3.5)
forms a Pareto allocation and, conversely, for (x, q) ∈R×RJ , every Pareto
allocation of the total endowment Σ(x, q) is given by (3.5) for some v ∈
(0,∞)M . Moreover, pi(v1, x, q) = pi(v2, x, q) if and only if v1 = cv2 for some
constant c > 0 and, therefore, (3.5) defines a one-to-one correspondence be-
tween the Pareto allocations with total endowment Σ(x, q) and the set
S
M ,
{
w ∈ (0,1)M :
M∑
m=1
wm = 1
}
,
the interior of the simplex in RM . Following [5], we denote by
pi :A→ L0(RM ),
the random field of Pareto allocations given by (3.5). Clearly, the sample
paths of this random field are continuous. From the equivalence of (3.2)
and (3.3), we deduce that the Pareto allocation pi(a) can be equivalently
defined by
um(pi
m(a)) =
∂r
∂vm
(v,Σ(x, q)), m= 1, . . . ,M.(3.6)
In Corollary 3.2 below, we provide the description of the conditional
Pareto allocations in our economy, which is analogous to (3.5). The proof of
this corollary relies on the following general and well-known fact, which is a
conditional version of Theorem 3.1 in [5].
Theorem 3.1. Consider the family of market makers with utility func-
tions (um)m=1,...,M satisfying Assumption 2.1. Let G ⊂ F be a σ-field and
α ∈L0(RM ). Then the following statements are equivalent:
1. The allocation α is G-Pareto optimal.
2. Integrability condition (2.2) holds and there is a G-measurable random
variable λ with values in SM such that
λmu′m(α
m) =
∂r
∂x
(λ,Σ), m= 1, . . . ,M,(3.7)
where Σ,
∑M
m=1α
m and the function r = r(v,x) is defined in (3.1).
Moreover, such a random variable λ is defined uniquely in L0(G,SM ).
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Proof. 1 =⇒ 2: It is enough to show that
u′m(α
m)
u′1(α
1)
∈ L0(G, (0,∞)), m= 1, . . . ,M.(3.8)
Indeed, in this case, define
λm ,
1/u′m(α
m)∑M
k=1 1/u
′
k(α
k)
, m= 1, . . . ,M,
and observe that, as u′m are strictly decreasing functions, (α
m) is the only
allocation of Σ such that
λmu′m(α
m) = λ1u′1(α
1), m= 1, . . . ,M.
However, in view of (3.2), an allocation with such property is provided
by (3.7).
Clearly, every λ ∈ L0(G,SM ) obeying (3.7) also satisfies the equality above
and, hence, is defined uniquely.
Suppose (3.8) fails to hold for some indexm, for example, for m= 2. Then
we can find a random variable ξ such that
|ξ| ≤ 1, (u′1(α
1 − 1) + u′2(α
2 − 1))|ξ| ∈ L1(R),(3.9)
and the set
A, {ω ∈Ω:E[u′1(α
1)ξ|G](ω)< 0< E[u′2(α
2)ξ|G](ω)}
has positive probability. For instance, we can take
ξ ,
ζ − E˜[ζ|G]
1 + u′1(α
1 − 1) + u′2(α
2 − 1)
,
where
ζ ,
u′2(α
2)
u′1(α
1) + u′2(α
2)
and E˜ is the expectation under the probability measure P˜ with the density
dP˜
dP
= const
u′1(α
1) + u′2(α
2)
1 + u′1(α
1 − 1) + u′2(α
2 − 1)
.
Indeed, in this case, (3.9) holds easily, while, as direct computations show
A= {ω ∈Ω: E˜[(ζ − E˜[ζ|G])2|G](ω)> 0}
and P[A]> 0 because ζ is not G-measurable.
From the continuity of the first derivatives of the utility functions, we
deduce the existence of 0< ε < 1 such that the set
B , {ω ∈Ω:E[u′1(α
1 − εξ)ξ|G](ω)< 0< E[u′2(α
2 + εξ)ξ|G](ω)}
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also has positive probability. Denoting η , εξ1B and observing that, by the
concavity of utility functions,
u1(α
1)≤ u1(α
1 − η) + u′1(α
1 − η)η,
u2(α
2)≤ u2(α
2 + η)− u′2(α
2 + η)η,
we obtain that the allocation
β1 = α1 − η, β2 = α2 + η, βm = αm, m= 3, . . . ,M,
satisfies (2.3), (2.4) and (2.5), thus contradicting the G-Pareto optimality of
α.
2 =⇒ 1: For every allocation β ∈ L0(RM ) with the same total endowment
Σ as α, we have
M∑
m=1
λmum(β
m)≤ r(λ,Σ)=
M∑
m=1
λmum(α
m),(3.10)
where the last equality is equivalent to (3.7) in view of (3.2). Granted inte-
grability as in (2.2), this clearly implies the G-Pareto optimality of α. 
From Theorem 3.1 and the definition of the random field pi = pi(a) in (3.5),
we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 3.2. Let Assumptions 2.1 and 2.4 hold and consider a σ-
field G ⊂F and random variables ξ ∈L0(G,R) and θ ∈ L0(G,RJ ).
Then for every λ ∈ L0(G, (0,∞)M ) the random vector pi(λ, ξ, θ) forms a
G-Pareto allocation. Conversely, every G-Pareto allocation of the total en-
dowment Σ(ξ, θ) is given by pi(λ, ξ, θ) for some λ ∈L0(G, (0,∞)M ).
Proof. The only delicate point is to show that the allocation
αm , pim(λ, ξ, θ), m= 1, . . . ,M,
satisfies the integrability condition (2.2). Lemma 2.5 implies the existence
of an allocation β of Σ(ξ, θ) satisfying (2.8). The result now follows from
inequality (3.10) which holds true by the properties of r= r(v,x). 
3.2. Stochastic field of aggregate utilities and its conjugate. A key role in
the construction of the general investment strategies will be played by the
stochastic field F of aggregate utilities and its saddle conjugate stochastic
field G given by
Ft(a), E[r(v,Σ(x, q))|Ft], a= (v,x, q) ∈A,(3.11)
Gt(b), sup
v∈(0,∞)M
inf
x∈R
[〈v,u〉+ xy −Ft(v,x, q)],
(3.12)
b= (u, y, q) ∈B,
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where t ∈ [0, T ], the aggregate utility function r = r(v,x) is given by (3.1),
the parameter set A is defined in (3.4), and
B, (−∞,0)M × (0,∞)×RJ .
These stochastic fields are studied in [6]. For the convenience of future ref-
erences, we recall below some of their properties.
First, we need to introduce some notation. For a nonnegative integer m
and an open subset U of Rd denote by Cm = Cm(U) the Fre´chet space
of m-times continuously differentiable maps f :U → R with the topology
generated by the semi-norms
‖f‖m,C ,
∑
0≤|k|≤m
sup
x∈C
|Dkf(x)|.(3.13)
Here, C is a compact subset of U , k = (k1, . . . , kd) is a multi-index of non-
negative integers, |k|,
∑d
i=1 ki, and
Dk ,
∂|k|
∂xk11 · · ·∂x
kd
d
.(3.14)
In particular, form= 0,D0 is the identity operator and ‖f‖0,C , supx∈C |f(x)|.
For a metric spaceX, we denote byD([0, T ],X) the space of RCLL (right-
continuous with left limits) maps of [0, T ] to X.
Suppose now that Assumptions 2.1 and 2.4 hold. Note that in [6] instead
of Assumption 2.4 we used the equivalent condition:
E[r(v,Σ(x, q))]>−∞, (v,x, q) ∈A;(3.15)
see Lemma 3.2 in [5] for the proof of equivalence. Theorem 4.1 and Corol-
lary 4.3 in [6] describe in detail the properties of the sample paths of
the stochastic fields F and G. In particular, these sample paths belong
to D([0, T ],C1) and for every t ∈ [0, T ], a = (w,x, q) ∈ SM ×R×RJ , and
b= (u,1, q) with u ∈ (−∞,0)M we have the invertibility relations
w =
∂Gt
∂u
(
∂Ft
∂v
(a, t),1, q
)/( M∑
m=1
∂Gt
∂um
(
∂Ft
∂v
(a),1, q
))
,(3.16)
x=Gt
(
∂Ft
∂v
(a),1, q
)
,(3.17)
u=
∂Ft
∂v
(
∂Gt
∂u
(b),G(b), q
)
(3.18)
=
∂Ft
∂v
(
∂Gt
∂u
(b)
/( M∑
m=1
∂G
∂um
(b)
)
,G(b), q
)
.
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Moreover, the left-limits Ft−(·) and Gt−(·) are conjugate to each other in a
sense analogous to (3.12) and they also satisfy the corresponding versions of
the invertibility relations (3.16)–(3.18).
Theorem 4.1 in [6] also states that
∂Ft
∂ai
(a) = E
[
∂FT
∂ai
(a)
∣∣∣Ft], t ∈ [0, T ], a ∈A,
which, in view of (3.6), implies that the derivatives of F with respect to
v equal to the expected utilities of the market markers given the Pareto
allocation pi(a):
∂Ft
∂vm
(a) = E[um(pi
m(a))|Ft], m= 1, . . . ,M.(3.19)
By (3.17), the random variable Gt(u,1, q) then defines the collective cash
amount of the market makers at time t when their current expected utilities
are given by u and they jointly own q stocks.
If Assumption 2.2 holds as well, then by Theorem 4.2 in [6], the sample
paths of F and G get an extra degree of smoothness; they now belong to
D([0, T ],C2).
4. Continuous-time strategies. We proceed now with the main topic
of the paper, which is the construction of trading strategies with general
continuous-time dynamics. Recall that the key economic assumption of our
model is that the large investor can re-balance his portfolio without changing
the expected utilities of the market makers.
4.1. Simple strategies revisited. To facilitate the transition from the dis-
crete evolution in Section 2.2 to the continuous dynamics below, we begin
by revisiting the case of a simple strategy
Qt =
N∑
n=1
θn1(τn−1,τn](t), 0≤ t≤ T,(4.1)
with stopping times 0 = τ0 ≤ · · · ≤ τN = T and random variables θn ∈
L
0(Fτn−1 ,R
J), n= 1, . . . ,N .
The following result is an improvement over Theorem 2.7 in the sense
that the forward induction for cash balances and Pareto optimal allocations
is now made explicit through the use of the parameterization pi = pi(a) of
Pareto allocations from (3.5) and the stochastic fields F = Ft(a) = F (a, t)
and G=Gt(b) =G(b, t) defined in (3.11) and (3.12).
Denote by λ0 ∈ S
M the weight of the initial Pareto allocation α0. This
weight is uniquely determined by Theorem 3.1.
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Theorem 4.1. Let Assumptions 2.1 and 2.4 hold and consider a simple
strategy Q given by (4.1). Then the sequence of conditionally Pareto optimal
allocations (αn)n=0,...,N constructed in Theorem 2.7 takes the form
αn = pi(ζn), n= 0, . . . ,N,(4.2)
where ζ0 , (λ0,0,0) and the random vectors ζn , (λn, ξn, θn) ∈ L
0(SM ×R×
R
J ,Fτn−1), n= 1, . . . ,N , with λn and ξn uniquely determined by
λn =
∂G
∂u
(
∂F
∂v
(ζn−1, τn−1),1, θn, τn−1
)
(4.3) /( M∑
m=1
∂G
∂um
(
∂F
∂v
(ζn−1, τn−1),1, θn, τn−1
))
,
ξn =G
(
∂F
∂v
(ζn−1, τn−1),1, θn, τn−1
)
.(4.4)
Proof. The recurrence relations (4.3) and (4.4) clearly determine λn
and ξn, n= 1, . . . ,N , uniquely. In view of the identity (3.19), for condition-
ally Pareto optimal allocations (αn)n=0,...,N defined by (4.2) the indifference
condition (2.11) can be expressed as
∂F
∂v
(ζn, τn−1) =
∂F
∂v
(ζn−1, τn−1), n= 1, . . . ,N,(4.5)
which, by the invertibility relations (3.16) and (3.17) and the fact that λn
has values in SM , is, in turn, equivalent to (4.3) and (4.4). 
In the setting of Theorem 4.1, let A, (W,X,Q), where
Wt = λ01[0](t) +
N∑
n=1
λn1(τn−1,τn](t),(4.6)
Xt =
N∑
n=1
ξn1(τn−1,τn](t).(4.7)
Then A is a simple predictable process with values in A:
At = ζ01[0](t) +
N∑
n=1
ζn1(τn−1,τn](t), 0≤ t≤ T,(4.8)
with ζn belonging to L
0(Fτn−1 ,A) and defined in Theorem 4.1. It was shown
in the proof of this theorem that the main condition (2.11) of the preserva-
tion of expected utilities is equivalent to (4.5). Observe now that (4.5) can
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also be expressed as
∂F
∂v
(At, t) =
∂F
∂v
(A0,0) +
∫ t
0
∂F
∂v
(As, ds), 0≤ t≤ T,(4.9)
where, for a simple process A as in (4.8),∫ t
0
∂F
∂v
(As, ds),
N∑
n=1
(
∂F
∂v
(ζn, τn ∧ t)−
∂F
∂v
(ζn, τn−1 ∧ t)
)
denotes its nonlinear stochastic integral against the random field ∂F∂v . Note
that, contrary to (2.11) and (4.5), the condition (4.9) also makes sense for
predictable processes A which are not necessarily simple, provided that the
nonlinear stochastic integral
∫
∂F
∂v (As, ds) is well defined. This will be key
for extending our model to general predictable strategies in the next section.
4.2. Extension to general predictable strategies. For a general predictable
process A, the construction of
∫
∂F
∂v (As, ds) requires additional conditions on
the stochastic field ∂F∂v =
∂F
∂v (a, t); see, for example, Sznitman [26] and Kunita
[19], Section 3.2. We choose to rely on [19], where the corresponding theory
of stochastic integration is developed for continuous semi-martingales. To
simplify notation, we shall work in a finite-dimensional Brownian setting.
We assume that, for every a ∈A, the martingale F (a) of (3.11) admits an
integral representation of the form
Ft(a) = F0(a) +
∫ t
0
Hs(a)dBs, 0≤ t≤ T,(4.10)
where B is a d-dimensional Brownian motion and H(a) is a predictable pro-
cess with values in Rd. Of course, the integral representation (4.10) holds
automatically if the filtration (Ft)0≤t≤T is generated by B. To use the con-
struction of the stochastic integral
∫
∂F
∂v (As, ds) from [19], we have to impose
an additional regularity condition on the integrand H with respect to the
parameter a.
Assumption 4.2. There exists a stochastic fieldH =Ht(a) such that for
every a ∈A the process H(a) = (Ht(a))t∈[0,T ] is predictable and satisfies the
integral representation (4.10). In addition, for every t ∈ [0, T ], the random
field Ht(·) has sample paths in C
1(A,Rd), and for every compact set C ⊂A∫ T
0
‖Ht‖
2
1,C dt <∞,
where the semi-norm ‖ · ‖m,C is given by (3.13).
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See Remark 4.10 below regarding the verification of this assumption in
terms of the primal inputs to our model.
Hereafter, we shall work under Assumptions 2.1, 2.4 and 4.2. For conve-
nience of future references, we formulate an easy corollary of the properties
of the sample paths of F and G stated in Section 3.2. For a metric space X
denote by C([0, T ],X), the space of continuous maps of [0, T ] to X. Recall
the definition of the Fre´chet space Cm from Section 3.2.
Lemma 4.3. Under Assumptions 2.1, 2.4 and 4.2, the stochastic fields
F = Ft(a) and G=Gt(b) have sample paths in C([0, T ],C
1). If, in addition,
Assumption 2.2 holds, then F and G have sample paths in C([0, T ],C2).
Proof. As we recalled in Section 3.2, Theorem 4.1 in [6] implies that
under Assumptions 2.1 and 2.4 the stochastic fields F and G have sample
paths in the space D([0, T ],C1) of RCLL maps and that their left-limits sat-
isfy conjugacy relations analogous to (3.12). Moreover, under the additional
Assumption 2.2, Theorem 4.2 in [6] implies that the sample paths of F and
G belong to D([0, T ],C2). These results readily imply the assertions of the
lemma as soon as we observe that, in view of (4.10), for every a ∈A, the
trajectories of the martingale F (a) are continuous. 
We also need the following elementary fact. Recall that if ξ and η are
stochastic fields on A then η is a modification of ξ if ξ(x) = η(x) for every
x ∈A.
Lemma 4.4. Let m be a nonnegative integer, U be an open set in Rn,
and ξ :U → L0(R) be a random field with sample paths in Cm =Cm(U) such
that for every compact set C ⊂U
E[‖ξ‖m,C ]<∞.(4.11)
Assume also that there are a Brownian motion B with values in Rd and a
stochastic field H =Ht(x) :U × [0, T ]→R
d such that for every t ∈ [0, T ] the
random field Ht(·) has sample paths in C
m(U,Rd) and such that for every
x ∈ U the process H(x) is predictable with
Mt(x), E[ξ(x)|Ft] =M0(x) +
∫ t
0
Hs(x)dBs.(4.12)
Suppose finally that for every compact set C ⊂ U∫ T
0
‖Ht‖
2
m,C dt <∞.(4.13)
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Then M has a modification with sample paths in C([0, T ],Cm(U)) and for
t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ U , and a multi-index k = (k1, . . . , kn) with |k| ≤m,
DkMt(x) =D
kM0(x) +
∫ t
0
DkHs(x)dBs,(4.14)
where the differential operator Dk is given by (3.14).
Proof. Observe first that (4.11) implies thatM has a modification with
sample paths in D([0, T ],Cm(U)); see Lemma C.1 in [6]. We shall work with
this modification. As, for every x ∈ U , the martingale M(x) is continuous,
we deduce that the sample paths of M belong to C([0, T ],Cm(U)).
To verify (4.14), it is sufficient to consider the case m = 1 and k =
(1,0, . . . ,0). Denote e1 , (1,0, . . . ,0) ∈R
n. By (4.11),
lim
ε→0
E
[
1
ε
∣∣∣∣ξ(x+ εe1)− ξ(x)− ε ∂ξ∂x1 (x)
∣∣∣∣]= 0
and then, by Doob’s inequality,
lim
ε→0
1
ε
(
M(x+ εe1)−M(x)− ε
∂M
∂x1
(x)
)∗
T
= 0,
where X∗T , supt∈[0,T ] |Xt|. Observe also that by (4.13)
lim
ε→0
∫ T
0
∣∣∣∣1ε
(
H(x+ εe1)−H(x)− ε
∂H
∂x1
(x)
)∣∣∣∣2 dt= 0.
The result now follows from the fact that for a sequence of continuous local
martingales (Nn)n≥1 its maximal elements (N
n)∗T , supt∈[0,T ] |N
n
t | converge
to 0 in probability if and only if the initial values Nn0 and the quadratic
variations 〈Nn〉T converge to 0 in probability. 
Remark 4.5. If the filtration is generated by a d-dimensional Brownian
motion B, then the integral representation (4.12) holds automatically. In this
case, the results of [26], based on Sobolev’s embeddings and Itoˆ’s isometry,
show that (4.13) with m =m1 follows from (4.11) with m =m2 provided
that m1 <m2 − d/2; see our companion paper [7].
From Lemma 4.4, we deduce
∂Ft
∂v
(a) =
∂F0
∂v
(a) +
∫ t
0
∂Hs
∂v
(a)dBs.
Following Section 3.2 in [19], we say that a predictable process A with values
in A is integrable with respect to the kernel ∂F∂v (·, dt) or, equivalently, that
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the stochastic integral
∫
∂F
∂v (As, ds) is well defined if∫ T
0
∣∣∣∣∂Ht∂v (At)
∣∣∣∣2 dt <∞.
In this case, we set∫ t
0
∂F
∂v
(As, ds),
∫ t
0
∂Hs
∂v
(As)dBs, 0≤ t≤ T.
We are now in a position to give a formal definition of a general trading
strategy. Recall that processes X and Y are indistinguishable if (X −Y )∗T ,
supt∈[0,T ] |Xt − Yt|= 0.
Definition 4.6. A predictable process Q with values in RJ is called a
strategy if there are unique (in the sense of indistinguishability) predictable
processes W and X with values in SM and R, respectively, such that, for
A, (W,X,Q), the initial Pareto allocation is given by
α0 = pi(A0),(4.15)
the stochastic integral
∫
∂F
∂v (As, ds) is well defined and (4.9) holds.
Remark 4.7. From now on, the term “strategy” will always be used
in the sense of Definition 4.6. Note that, at this point, it is still an open
question whether a simple predictable process Q is a (valid) strategy, as in
Theorem 4.1 the uniqueness of W and X , such that A , (W,X,Q) solves
(4.9), was proved only in the class of simple processes. The affirmative an-
swer to this question will be given in Theorem 4.19 below, where in addition
to the standing Assumptions 2.1, 2.4 and 4.2, we shall also require Assump-
tions 2.2 and 4.15.
The predictable processes W and X in Definition 4.6 will be called the
Pareto weights and cash balance processes for the strategy Q. We remind
the reader, that the bookkeeping in our model is done from the collective
point of view of the market makers; see Remark 2.6. In other words, for a
strategy Q, the number of shares and the amount of cash owned by the large
investor at time t are given by −Qt and −Xt.
Accounting for (3.19), we call
Ut ,
∂Ft
∂v
(At), 0≤ t≤ T,(4.16)
the process of expected utilities for the market makers. Observe that, as
U < 0 and U − U0 is a stochastic integral with respect to a Brownian mo-
tion, U is a local martingale and a (global) sub-martingale. The invertibility
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relations (3.16) and (3.17) imply the following expressions for W and X in
terms of U and Q:
Wt =
∂Gt
∂u
(Ut,1,Qt)
/( M∑
m=1
∂Gt
∂um
(Ut,1,Qt)
)
,(4.17)
Xt =Gt(Ut,1,Qt).(4.18)
We also call
Vt ,−Gt(Ut,1,0) =−Gt
(
∂Ft
∂v
(At),1,0
)
, 0≤ t≤ T,(4.19)
the cumulative gain process for the large trader. This term is justified as,
by (4.18), Vt represents the cash amount the agent will hold at t if he liqui-
dates his position in stocks. Of course, at maturity
VT =−(XT + 〈QT , ψ〉).
It is interesting to observe that, contrary to the standard, small agent,
model of mathematical finance, no further “admissibility” conditions on a
strategy Q are needed to exclude an arbitrage.
Lemma 4.8. Let Assumptions 2.1, 2.4 and 4.2 hold and Q be a strategy
such that the terminal gain of the large trader is nonnegative: VT ≥ 0. Then,
in fact, VT = 0.
Proof. Recall the notation λ0 ∈ S
M for the weights and Σ0 ∈ L
0(RM )
for the total endowment of the initial Pareto allocation α0 and r= r(v,x) for
the aggregate utility function from (3.1). Denote by α1 the terminal wealth
distribution between the market makers at maturity resulting from the strat-
egy Q. From the characterization of Pareto allocations in Theorem 3.1 and
the sub-martingale property of the process U of expected utilities, we obtain
E[r(λ0,Σ0)] = E
[
m∑
m=1
λm0 um(α
m
0 )
]
= 〈λ0,U0〉 ≤ E[〈λ0,UT 〉]
= E
[
m∑
m=1
λm0 um(α
m
1 )
]
≤ E[r(λ0,Σ0− VT )].
Since r(λ0, ·) is a strictly increasing function, the result follows. 
We state now a key result of the paper where we reduce the question
whether a predictable process Q is a strategy to the unique solvability of a
stochastic differential equation parameterized by Q.
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Theorem 4.9. Under Assumptions 2.1, 2.4 and 4.2, a predictable pro-
cess Q with values in RJ is a strategy if and only if the stochastic differential
equation
Ut = U0 +
∫ t
0
Ks(Us,Qs)dBs,(4.20)
has a unique strong solution U with values in (−∞,0)M on [0, T ], where
Um0 , E[um(α
m
0 )], m= 1, . . . ,M,
and, for u ∈ (−∞,0)M , q ∈RJ and t ∈ [0, T ],
Kt(u, q),
∂Ht
∂v
(
∂Gt
∂u
(u,1, q),Gt(u,1, q), q
)
.(4.21)
In this case, U is the process of expected utilities, and the processes of Pareto
weights W and cash balance X are given by (4.17) and (4.18).
Proof. Observe that the stochastic field F = Ft(v,x, q) is positive ho-
mogeneous with respect to v:
Ft(cv, x, q) = cFt(v,x, q), c > 0,
and that the integrand H = Ht(v,x, q), clearly, shares same property. It
follows that
∂Ht
∂v
(cv, x, q) =
∂Ht
∂v
(v,x, q), c > 0,
and, therefore, that the stochastic field K from (4.21) can also be written
as
Kt(u, q) =
∂Ht
∂v
(
∂Gt
∂u
(u,1, q)
/( M∑
m=1
∂Gt
∂um
(u,1, q)
)
,Gt(u,1, q), q
)
.
After this observation, the result is an immediate consequence of the defini-
tion of a strategy and the expressions (4.17) and (4.18) for the processes of
Pareto weights W and cash balance X . 
Remark 4.10. In the follow-up paper [7], we provide sufficient condi-
tions for a locally bounded predictable process Q with values in RJ to be a
strategy, or equivalently, for (4.20) to have a unique strong solution, in terms
of the “original” inputs to the model: the utility functions (um)m=1,...,M , the
initial endowment Σ0, and the dividends ψ. In particular, these conditions
also imply Assumptions 4.2 and 4.15 on H =Ht(a).
As an illustration, we give an example where (4.20) is a linear equation,
and, hence, can be solved explicitly.
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Example 4.11 (Bachelier model with price impact). Consider an econ-
omy with a single market maker and one stock. The market maker’s utility
function is exponential:
u(x) =−
1
γ
e−γx, x ∈R,
where the constant γ > 0 is the absolute risk-aversion coefficient. The initial
endowment of the market maker and the payoff of the stock are given by
Σ0 = α0 = b+
µ
γσ
BT ,
ψ = s+ µT + σBT ,
where the constants b,µ, s ∈R and σ > 0. Note that the initial Pareto pricing
measure Q=Q0 and the stock price S have the expressions
dQ
dP
, constu′(Σ0) = e
−(µ/σ)BT−(µ
2/(2σ2))T ,
St , EQ0 [ψ|Ft] = s+ µt+ σBt, t ∈ [0, T ],
and coincide with the martingale measure and the stock price in the classical
Bachelier model for a “small” investor.
Direct computations show that, for a= (v,x, q) ∈A,
Ft(a) = ve
−γxNt(q),
where the martingale N(q) evolves as
dNt(q) =−
(
µ
σ
+ γσq
)
Nt(q)dBt.(4.22)
For the integrand H =Ht(a) in (4.10) and the stochastic field G = Gt(b),
we obtain
∂Ht
∂v
(a) =−
(
µ
σ
+ γσq
)
e−γxNt(q),
u= e−γGt(u,1,q)Nt(q), u ∈ (−∞,0),
where the second equality follows from (3.18). The stochastic field K =
Kt(u, q) in (4.21) is then given by
Kt(u, q) =−
(
µ
σ
+ γσq
)
u, u ∈ (−∞,0).
From Theorem 4.9, we obtain that a predictable process Q is a strategy
if and only if ∫ T
0
Q2t dt <∞,
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and that, in this case, the expected utility process U for the market maker
evolves as
dUt =−
(
µ
σ
+ γσQt
)
Ut dBt.(4.23)
Observe now that, by (4.19), the cumulative gain Vt of the large trader
satisfies
Ut = e
γVtNt(0).
From (4.22) and (4.23) and the fact that V0 = 0, we deduce
Vt =
∫ t
0
[
(−Qr)(µdr+ σ dBr)−
γσ2
2
Q2r dr
]
=
∫ t
0
[
(−Qr)dSr −
γσ2
2
Q2r dr
]
.
Recall that −Q denotes the number of shares owned by the large investor
and then observe that the first, linear with respect to Q, term yields the
wealth evolution in the classical Bachelier model. The second, quadratic,
term thus describes the feedback effect of the large trader’s actions on stock
prices, with the risk-aversion coefficient γ > 0 playing the role of a price
impact coefficient.
4.3. Maximal local strategies. For a stochastic process X and a stopping
time σ with values in [0, T ], recall the notation Xσ , (Xt∧σ)0≤t≤T for X
“stopped” at σ. The following localization fact for strategies will be used
later on several occasions.
Lemma 4.12. Let Assumptions 2.1, 2.4 and 4.2 hold, σ be a stopping
time with values in [0, T ], Q be a strategy andW , X, V and U be its processes
of Pareto weights, cash balance, cumulative gain and expected utilities. Then
Qσ is also a strategy and W σ and Xσ are its processes of Pareto weights
and cash balance. The processes of cumulative gain, V (Qσ), and of expected
utilities, U(Qσ), for the strategy Qσ coincide with V and U on [0, σ], while
on (σ,T ] they are given by
U(Qσ)t =
∂Ft
∂v
(Wσ,Xσ,Qσ),
V (Qσ)t =−Gt(U(Q
σ)t,1,0).
Proof. The proof follows directly from Definition 4.6 and the construc-
tion of U and V in (4.16) and (4.19). 
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Let τ be a stopping time with values in (0, T ] ∪ {∞} and U be a process
with values in (−∞,0)M defined on [0, τ)∩ [0, T ]. Recall that, for the equa-
tion (4.20), τ and U are called the explosion time and the maximal local
solution if for every stopping time σ with values in [0, τ)∩ [0, T ] the process
Uσ is the unique solution to (4.20) on [0, σ] and
limsup
t↑τ
|log(−Ut)|=∞ on {τ <∞}.(4.24)
Observe that, for m= 1, . . . ,M , the sub-martingale property of Um < 0 in-
sures the existence of the limit: limt↑τ U
m
t and prevents it from being −∞.
Hence, (4.24) is equivalent to
lim
t↑τ
max
m=1,...,M
Umt = 0 on {τ <∞}.
For convenience of future references, we introduce a similar localized con-
cept for strategies.
Definition 4.13. A predictable process Q with values in RJ is called a
maximal local strategy if there are a stopping time τ with values in (0, T ] ∪
{∞} and processes V , W and X on [0, τ)∩ [0, T ] with values in R, SM and
R, respectively, such that
lim
t↑τ
Vt =−∞ on {τ <∞}(4.25)
and for every stopping time σ with values in [0, τ)∩ [0, T ] the process Qσ is
a strategy with Pareto weights W σ and cash balance Xσ whose cumulative
gain equals V on [0, σ].
Similar to the “global” case we call V , W and X from Definition 4.13 the
processes of cumulative gain, Pareto weights and cash balance, respectively;
the process U of expected utilities is defined on [0, τ)∩ [0, T ] as in (4.16). In
view of (4.25), we call τ the explosion time for V . Note that, by Lemma 4.12,
the class of maximal local strategies contains the class of (global) strategies.
Theorem 4.14. Let Assumptions 2.1, 2.4 and 4.2 hold and τ be a stop-
ping time with values in (0, T ]∪{∞}. A predictable process Q with values in
R
J is a maximal local strategy and τ is the explosion time for its cumula-
tive gain process V if and only if the stochastic differential equation (4.20)
admits the unique maximal local solution U with the explosion time τ .
If, in addition, Q is locally bounded, then τ is also the explosion time for
its cash balance process:
lim
t↑τ
Xt =∞ on {τ <∞}.
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Proof. By Theorem 4.1 in [6], for every t ∈ [0, T ] the random field Gt(·)
has sample paths in a certain space G˜1 of continuously differentiable saddle
functions on B. Among other properties, a function g = g(b) = g(u, y, q) in
G˜
1 is convex with respect to q, strictly increasing with respect to u, and
lim
n→∞
g(un,1, q) =∞(4.26)
for every sequence (un)n≥1 in (−∞,0)
M converging to a boundary point of
(−∞,0)M ; see the properties (G2), (G3) and (G6) of the elements of G˜1
in [6].
These properties readily imply that if (gn)n≥1 is a sequence in G˜
1 which
converges to g ∈ G˜1 in C1(B), then
lim
n→∞
inf
q∈C
gn(un,1, q) =∞(4.27)
for every compact set C ⊂ RJ and every sequence (un)n≥1 in (−∞,0)
M
converging to a boundary point of (−∞,0)M . Indeed, because of the q-
convexity and the u-monotonicity, it is sufficient to consider the case when
C is a singleton and the sequence (un)n≥1 is increasing. Then, for q ∈R
J ,
lim inf
n→∞
gn(un,1, q)≥ lim
k→∞
lim inf
n→∞
gn(uk,1, q) = lim
k→∞
g(uk,1, q) =∞,
where the last equality follows from (4.26).
Since, by Lemma 4.3, the stochastic field G=Gt(b) has sample paths in
C([0, T ],C1(B)), the property (4.27) readily yields the result as soon as we
recall the constructions of V and X in (4.19) and (4.18). Observe that in the
argument concerning X we can assume, by localization, that Q is (globally)
bounded and, hence, takes values in some compact set C ⊂RJ . 
To establish the existence of a maximal local strategy or, equivalently, the
existence and uniqueness of a maximal local solution to (4.20) we shall also
require Assumption 2.2 and a stronger version of Assumption 4.2.
Assumption 4.15. For every t ∈ [0, T ], the random field Ht(·) from
Assumption 4.2 has sample paths in C2(A,Rd) and, for every compact set
C ⊂A, ∫ T
0
‖Ht‖
2
2,C dt <∞.
The role of these additional assumptions is to guarantee the local Lipschitz
property with respect to u for the stochastic field K in (4.21).
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Lemma 4.16. Let Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, 4.2 and 4.15 hold and K
be the stochastic field defined in (4.21). Then for every t ∈ [0, T ] the random
field Kt(·) has sample paths in C
1((−∞,0)M ×RJ ,RM×d) and, for every
compact set C ⊂ (−∞,0)M ×RJ ,∫ T
0
‖Kt‖
2
1,C dt <∞.
Proof. This follows from Assumption 4.15 and the fact that by Lem-
ma 4.3, the stochastic field G=Gt(b) has sample paths in C([0, T ],C
2(B)).

Theorem 4.17. Let Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, 4.2 and 4.15 hold and
Q be a predictable process with values in RJ such that, for every compact
set C ⊂ (−∞,0)M , ∫ T
0
‖Kt(·,Qt)‖
2
1,C dt <∞.(4.28)
Then Q is a maximal local strategy.
Proof. It is well known (see, e.g., Theorem 3.4.5 in [19]) that (4.28)
implies the existence of a unique maximal local solution to (4.20). The result
now follows from Theorem 4.14. 
Theorem 4.18. Under Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, 4.2 and 4.15 every
locally bounded predictable process Q is a maximal local strategy.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 4.17 if we observe that, by Lem-
ma 4.16, a locally bounded Q satisfies (4.28). 
The preceding result allows us to finally reconcile Definition 4.6 with the
construction of simple strategies in Theorems 2.7 and 4.1 since it resolves
the uniqueness issue raised in Remark 4.7.
Theorem 4.19. Under Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, 4.2 and 4.15 every
simple predictable process Q with values in RJ is a strategy and its processes
of Pareto weights W and cash balance X are simple and given by (4.6)–(4.7)
and (4.3)–(4.4).
Proof. The fact, that, for W and X given by (4.6)–(4.7) and (4.3)–
(4.4), the process A, (W,X,Q) satisfies (4.15) and (4.9) has been already
established in our discussion following Theorem 4.1. The uniqueness follows
from Theorem 4.18. 
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5. Approximation by simple strategies. In this final section, we provide
a justification for the construction of the general strategies in Definition 4.6
by discussing approximations based on simple strategies. To simplify the
presentation, we restrict ourselves to the case of locally bounded processes.
For measurable stochastic processes, in addition to the ucp convergence
defined by the metric
ducp(X,Y ), E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xt − Yt| ∧ 1
]
,
we also consider the convergence in the space L0(dP× dt) with the metric
dL0(X,Y ), E
[∫ T
0
(|Xt − Yt| ∧ 1)dt
]
.
We call a sequence of stochastic processes (Xn)n≥1 uniformly locally bounded
from above if there is an increasing sequence of stopping times (σn)n≥1 such
that P[σn < T ]→ 0, n→∞ and X
k
t ≤ n on [0, σn] for k ≥ 1. The sequence
(Xn)n≥1 is called uniformly locally bounded if the sequence of its absolute
values (|Xn|)n≥1 is uniformly locally bounded from above.
We begin with a general convergence result:
Theorem 5.1. Let Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, 4.2 and 4.15 hold and
consider a sequence of strategies (Qn)n≥1 which is uniformly locally bounded
and converges to a strategy Q in L0(dP× dt).
Then the processes (Un, V n)n≥1, of expected utilities and cumulative gains,
converge to (U,V ) in ucp, the processes (W n,Xn)n≥1, of Pareto weights and
cash balance, converge to (W,X) in L0(dP× dt), and the sequence (Xn)n≥1
is uniformly locally bounded. If, in addition, the sequence (Qn)n≥1 converges
to Q in ucp, then the sequence (W n,Xn)n≥1 also converges to (W,X) in
ucp.
Proof. By standard localization arguments, we can assume the exis-
tence of constants a > 0 and b > 0 such that
max
(
|ln(−U)|, |Q|, sup
n≥1
|Qn|
)
≤ a,
and, in view of Lemma 4.16, such that∫ T
0
‖Ks(·)‖
2
1,C(a) ds≤ b,(5.1)
where
C(a), {(u, q) ∈ (−∞,0)M ×RJ :max(|ln(−u)|, |q|)≤ 2a}.
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Define the stopping times
σn , inf{t ∈ [0, T ] : |ln(−U
n
t )| ≥ 2a}, n≥ 1,
where we follow the convention that inf∅,∞. Observe that the ucp con-
vergence of (Un)n≥1 to U holds if
(U −Un)∗T∧σn → 0, n→∞.(5.2)
To prove (5.2), note first that for every two stopping times 0≤ τ∗ ≤ τ
∗ ≤
σn we have using Doob’s inequality
E
[
sup
τ∗≤t≤τ∗
|Ut −U
n
t |
2
]
≤ E
[
2|Uτ∗ −U
n
τ∗ |
2 +2 sup
τ∗≤t≤τ∗
∣∣∣∣∫ t
τ∗
(Ks(Us,Qs)−Ks(U
n
s ,Q
n
s ))dBs
∣∣∣∣2]
≤ 2E|Uτ∗ −U
n
τ∗ |
2 +8E
[∫ τ∗
τ∗
|Ks(Us,Qs)−Ks(U
n
s ,Q
n
s )|
2 ds
]
≤ 2E|Uτ∗ −U
n
τ∗ |
2
+8E
[∫ τ∗
τ∗
‖Ks(·)‖
2
1,C(a)(|Us −U
n
s |
2 + |Qs −Q
n
s |
2)ds
]
≤ 2E|Uτ∗ −U
n
τ∗ |
2 +8E
[∫ τ∗
τ∗
‖Ks(·)‖
2
1,C(a) ds sup
τ∗≤t≤τ∗
|Ut −U
n
t |
2
]
+8E
[∫ τ∗
τ∗
‖Ks(·)‖
2
1,C(a)|Qs −Q
n
s |
2 ds
]
.
Rearranging terms, we thus obtain
E
[(
1− 8
∫ τ∗
τ∗
‖Ks(·)‖
2
1,C(a) ds
)
sup
τ∗≤t≤τ∗
|Ut −U
n
t |
2
]
(5.3)
≤ 2E|Uτ∗ −U
n
τ∗ |
2 + 8E
[∫ τ∗
τ∗
‖Ks(·)‖
2
1,C(a)|Qs −Q
n
s |
2 ds
]
.
Now choose τ0 , 0 and, for i= 1,2, . . . , let
τi , inf
{
t≥ τi−1 : 8
∫ t
τi−1
‖Ks(·)‖
2
1,C(a) ds≥
1
2
}
∧ T.
Note that because of (5.1) we have τi = T for i≥ i0, where i0 is the smallest
integer greater than 16b. Hence, to establish (5.2), it suffices to prove
E
[
sup
τi−1∧σn≤s≤τi∧σn
|Us −U
n
s |
2
]
→ 0, n→∞ for i= 1, . . . , i0.
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For i= 1, this follows from estimate (5.3) with τ∗ , τ0 = 0 and τ
∗ , τ1 ∧ σ
n
because U0 = U
n
0 and because of our assumption on the sequence (Q
n)n≥1.
For i= 2,3, . . . this convergence holds by induction, since with τ∗ , τi−1∧σ
n
and τ∗ , τi ∧ σ
n the first term on the right-hand side of (5.3) vanishes for
n→∞ because of the validity of our claim for i− 1 and the second term
disappears again by assumption on (Qn)n≥1. This completes the proof of
the ucp convergence of (Un)n≥1 to U .
The rest of the assertions follows from the representations (4.17), (4.18)
and (4.19) for Pareto weights, cash balances and cumulative gains in terms
of the stochastic field G = Gt(b) and the fact that, by Lemma 4.3, G has
sample paths in C(C1(B), [0, T ]). 
Theorem 5.2. Under Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, 4.2 and 4.15, a pre-
dictable locally bounded process Q with values in RJ is a strategy if and only
if there is a sequence (Qn)n≥1 of simple strategies, which is uniformly lo-
cally bounded, converges to Q in L0(dP× dt), and for which the sequence of
associated cash balances (Xn)n≥1 is uniformly locally bounded from above.
For the proof, we need a lemma.
Lemma 5.3. Under Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.4 and 4.2, for every strategy
Q and every t ∈ [0, T ]
M∑
m=1
(
1
c
log((−Umt )∨ 1) + c log((−U
m
t )∧ 1)
)
≤Gt(−1,1,Qt)−Xt(5.4)
≤
M∑
m=1
(
1
c
log((−Umt )∧ 1) + c log((−U
m
t ) ∨ 1)
)
,
where c > 0 is taken from Assumption 2.2, 1, (1, . . . ,1) ∈RM , and X and
U are the processes of cash balance and expected utilities for Q.
Proof. Theorem 4.2 in [6] implies that under Assumptions 2.1, 2.2
and 2.4, for every t ∈ [0, T ] the random field Gt(·) has sample paths in
a certain space G˜2(c) of twice-differentiable saddle functions on B. The
property (G7) of the elements of G˜2(c) states that
1
c
≤−um
∂Gt
∂um
(u,1, q)≤ c, m= 1, . . . ,M.
This yields the result if we account for the representation (4.18) for X . 
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Proof of Theorem 5.2. The “only if” part follows from Theorem 5.1
and the fact that every locally bounded predictable process Q can be ap-
proximated in L0(dP × dt) by a sequence of simple predictable processes
(Qn)n≥1 which is uniformly locally bounded. Hereafter, we shall focus on
sufficiency.
By Theorem 4.18, Q is a maximal local strategy. Denote by U and X its
processes of expected utilities and cash balance and by τ the explosion time
of X ; see Theorem 4.14. We have to show that τ =∞.
For a > 0 and b > a, define the stopping times
τ(a), inf
{
t ∈ [0, T ] : max
m=1,...,M
Umt >−a
}
,
τn(a), inf
{
t ∈ [0, T ] : sup
k≥n
max
m=1,...,M
Uk,mt >−a
}
, n≥ 1,
σ(b), inf
{
t ∈ [0, T ] : min
m=1,...,M
Umt <−b
}
,
σn(b), inf
{
t ∈ [0, T ] : inf
k≥n
min
m=1,...,M
Uk,mt <−b
}
, n≥ 1,
where Un is the process of expected utilities for Qn and where we let inf∅,
∞. Note that, by Theorem 4.14, τ(a)→ τ , a→ 0, and hence, τ =∞ if and
only if
lim
a→0
P[τ(a)≤ T ] = 0.(5.5)
From Theorem 4.14 and Lemma 4.12, we deduce that Qτ(a)∧T is a strategy
whose expected utility process coincides with U on [0, τ(a) ∧ T ]. Hence, by
Theorem 5.1,
(Un −U)∗τ(a)∧T → 0, n→∞.(5.6)
Hereafter, we shall assume that a is rational and that, for every such a, the
convergence above takes place almost surely. This can always be arranged
by passing to a subsequence.
Since
{τ(a)< τn(2a)} ⊂
⋂
k≥n
{(Uk −U)∗τ(a)∧T ≥ a},
we obtain
lim
n→∞
P[τ(a)< τn(2a)] = 0.(5.7)
Similarly, as
{σn(2b) ∧ τ(a)< σ(b)∧ τ(a)} ⊂
⋃
k≥n
{(Uk −U)∗τ(a)∧T ≥ b},
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and since the convergence in (5.6) takes place almost surely, we deduce
lim
n→∞
P[σn(2b) ∧ τ(a)< σ(b) ∧ τ(a)] = 0.
The latter convergence implies that
lim sup
n→∞
P[σn(2b)< τ(a)]≤ P[σ(b)< τ(a)]≤ P[σ(b)< τ ].(5.8)
From (5.7) and (5.8), we deduce
P[τ(a)≤ T ]≤ P[σ(b)< τ ] + limsup
n→∞
P[τn(2a)≤ σn(2b)∧ T ].
Therefore, (5.5) holds if
lim
b→∞
P[σ(b)< τ ] = 0,(5.9)
and, for every b > 0,
lim
a→0
lim sup
n→∞
P[τn(a)≤ σn(b) ∧ T ] = 0.(5.10)
The verification of (5.9) is straightforward due to the sub-martingale
property of U . The uniform local boundedness conditions on (Qn)n≥1 and
(Xn)n≥1 (from above) and the fact that G has trajectories in C(C(B), [0, T ])
imply that the process
Yt , inf
n≥1
(G(−1,1,Qnt , t)−X
n
t ), 0≤ t≤ T,
is locally bounded from below. The convergence (5.10) follows now from the
second inequality in (5.4) of Lemma 5.3. 
We conclude this section with affirmative answers to our Questions 2.9
and 2.10 from Section 2.2. Recall that the acronym LCRL means left-
continuous with right limits.
Theorem 5.4. Under Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, 4.2 and 4.15, a pre-
dictable process Q with values in RJ and LCRL trajectories is a strategy if
and only if there is a predictable process X with values in R and a sequence
of simple strategies (Qn)n≥1 converging to Q in ucp such that the sequence
of its cash balances (Xn)n≥1 converges to X in ucp. In this case, X is the
cash balance process for Q.
Proof. This follows from Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 and the fact that every
predictable process with LCRL trajectories is a limit in ucp of a sequence of
simple processes which then necessarily is also uniformly locally bounded.

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